The Structural Limitations of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and its Future in a Contemporary Landscape

Introduction

The Responsibility to Protect doctrine is a United Nations initiative set out to prevent war crimes, ethnic cleansing, genocide and crimes against humanity – otherwise known as the ‘four crimes’. Moreover, the doctrine was endorsed by all member states of the United Nations in the 2005 World Summit under the guidance of three key pillars - a) The protection responsibilities of the state b) International assistance and capacity-building and c) Timely and decisive collective response. Inherently, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine could be an extremely useful policy to achieve cosmopolitan stability; however, this piece will explore how and why scholars examine the structural shortcomings of the doctrine rather than its potentialities. Accordingly, this piece will target the dilemmas that face policymakers and provide insight into the complexities of foreign intervention and struggles for mass consensus. Conversely, the piece will also aim to demonstrate the potential for success within the international community as a pure form of international cooperation, thus recommending ways it could be utilised within the modern international order.

State of the Field

The Responsibility to Protect doctrine has been analysed by many scholars who have identified key systematic issues within the doctrine. This piece will examine five key limitations that structurally restrict R2P from fulfilling its key aims. These include the mixed motives problem, the counterfactual issue, the conspicuous harm concern, the end-state problem, and the inconsistency challenge.

Firstly, the mixed motives problem relays to the mixed causes of actors to implement the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Indeed, it is suggested that there is a duality of self-interests and legitimate humanitarian concerns (Paris, 2014). This is framed through a narrative that when intervention occurs for political or militaristic reasoning, it undertakes an ideology of self-interest rather than the protection of civilian ideology. This is justified since it is uncommon for domestic military power to be used to achieve the greater good of the international community, whilst simultaneously putting a state’s own human resources at risk to stabilise foreign vulnerabilities. Indeed, while some scholars maintain a viewpoint that if the intervention pursues humanitarian objectives, it should be considered humanitarian in nature. However, the consensus from scholars is that the motives underpin the eventual objectives and therefore should not be considered humanitarian. (Jacob, C., & Mennecke, M, 2019). Ultimately, this observation delegitimises the liberalist nature of R2P and targets the structural ‘good nature’ of what underpins the doctrine.

Secondly, the counterfactual problem pertains to the question of whether intervention can truly be considered successful. In essence, this can be explained through the fact that the successfulness of R2P can only truly be evaluated if one of the ‘four crimes’ is a ‘non-event’. (Paris, 2014) Instead, successes can only be judged on a ‘what if’ basis and therefore one cannot truly measure what implications the intervention has.

Thirdly, the conspicuous harm concern examines how the collateral damage of intervention will inevitably turn public sentiment against the policy.

“Few things are likely to damage the humanitarian credentials of a military operation more than the perception that it is increasing the overall risk to civilians”. (Bellamy, 2012)

Moreover, it is argued that people are more concerned with the ‘what is’, not the ‘what if’, meaning that when innocent civilians die as collateral damage, it may be difficult for many to comprehend the idea that intervention is coming from a humanitarian position, rather than an aggressive one. (Paris, 2014) This is intensified through the modern age of unregulated social media and new media. (Jacob, C., & Mennecke, M, 2019) Indeed, such media can have immediate effects on how the conflict is perceived from a political and social perspective. Ultimately, R2P is set out to be a liberalised policy that undertakes the moral high ground in conflicts, however, failure to appear as if it is so will likely result in the delegitimisation by the public of its own pillars.

Fourthly, the end-state problem is one of the most difficult challenges in practice. The problem aligns with the pillar ‘International assistance and capacity building’, which stipulates that states who intervene, also attain the responsibility to rebuild the state after conflict. However, this is a considerably difficult function to uphold due to its extremely broad umbrella of problems that must be addressed to achieve stability. The two main ways to address the end-state problem are through either regime change or undertaking a continued operation indefinitely; however, these notions both come with their difficulties. (Paris, 2014) Firstly, a regime change would extend the initial goal of preventing atrocities to a full-blown conflict, whilst also leading to questions being asked regarding the overarching motive of the intervention. Secondly, an indefinite operation would result in an open-ended policing that would not only extend the process (which may be undesirable for states who wished for a short-term resolution) but may be regarded by some as being an occupation that leads to a further multitude of political complexities. Inherently, states will have to be prepared for the fact that R2P will be a long-lasting affair that will have a legacy beyond the initial intervention. (Paris, 2014)

Lastly, the inconsistency challenge argues that there is an international discrepancy in responding to atrocities. This is explained by the fact that there are many global atrocities that could enforce R2P, however, states may refuse to or cannot intervene due to them believing that it is not in their national interests to intervene, or they may not have the capacity to intervene. Consequently, this weakens the doctrine since intervention in some cases, but not others will result in an appearance of double standards and thus weakening the overarching liberal fundamentals of the doctrine. (Jacob, C., & Mennecke, M, 2019)

Analysis

When analysing the scholarly arguments regarding the limitations of R2P, it is acknowledged that there are historical backings to many of the claims, however, it can simultaneously be argued that some of the viewpoints fail to identify the fact that R2P is used as a last-resort and the geopolitical complexities that come with foreign intervention.

Furthermore, the literature that examined the limitations of the R2P was analysed through a structural perspective, which simultaneously proves its arguments since the limitation have been backed through case studies. Moreover, when overlooking the inconsistency challenge, the statement encapsulates how there has been a considerable number of atrocities that fall under the ‘four crimes’ yet, there has not been any form of international intervention in many instances. Specifically, this is highlighted through a lack of military intervention in the Russia-Ukraine war. Although Russia has been accused of committing war crimes (by many of the same states who endorsed R2P in 2005), there has been no true military intervention and therefore the international community has not followed through with the universal conventions of the doctrine. This can ultimately be credited to geopolitical reasonings, yet it still highlights the overarching limitations of the doctrine.

Secondly, the end-state problem exemplifies the challenges of rebuilding a state after it has endured the consequences of conflict and intervention. Indeed, this issue has been evident throughout the military-led intervention in Libya, whereby the UNSC authorised intervention which subsequently led to a regime change. However, ever since the intervention, Libya has still struggled immensely with problems similar to the reasons why R2P was implemented in Libya in the first place. This is evident through the second civil war which began only a mere three years after the regime change.

However, just as the literature may correctly examine the structural limitations of the R2P doctrine, scholars generally fail to acknowledge that R2P is merely used as a last-resort tool to address atrocities. Certainly, whilst R2P can be used in extreme circumstances, many of the challenges described by scholars can be somewhat short-sighted. Wholistically, the doctrine was not necessarily created to prevent warfare or conflict, it was formed to “as a desirable alternative to war and intervention that should be pursued as a last resort”. (Pattison, 2015) Therefore, when dissecting the conspicuous harm argument for example, the issue narrowly recognises the challenges of ‘what if’, yet it does not acknowledge the ‘what has already happened’. This crucially delegitimises the aims of the R2P to imply that it bears the front of most collateral damage when realistically, intervention would not occur if there was already considerable collateral damage already.

Secondly, scholars don’t typically recognise the geopolitical limitations applied to the doctrine, which is paramount in preventing any success. Moreover, as R2P by nature is a cosmopolitan initiative, it will always be at the behest of the wider international community. Consequently, since global powers obtain alliances with states across the world, it is greatly difficult to achieve an agreement that appeases the entire international community. For instance, the Syrian Civil War is a prime example of how any sort of intervention by a US-led coalition, would consistently be vetoed by Russia and ultimately prevents any chance of success.

Recommendations

To improve the state of Responsibility to Protect within the international security field, it is recommended that scholarship alters its avenues of research to assist policymakers reach a variety of conclusions. Specifically, this will look at how foreign intervention could be portrayed in a win-win situation, a better understanding of the implications R2P has in the affected states and how increased ‘on the ground’ research could improve policy.

Firstly, a changed lens - much of the scholarship regarding why foreign intervention occurs is based on the principle that states do not garner a positive return from R2P, however, that may not necessarily be true. Certainly, a large challenge to the implementation of R2P is linked to the fact that states do not wish to risk their own resources on a foreign issue. Aligned with the functions of the inconsistency challenge and mixed motives problem, scholars could look towards the incentivisation of actors to use military intervention to ensure that the R2P can be used to its fullest effect. Furthermore, scholarship in essence may be able to shift the policymaking of intervention by examining how inaction from foreign states could result in regional or international conflict. This can be exemplified by the relative inaction in Syria during the early 2010s. Whilst foreign states did not adequately come to the defence of Syrian civilians, it could be argued that it caused greater instability which therefore led to regional difficulties including the rise of ISIS and the acceleration of political instabilities within the Middle East and North Africa. (Averre & Davies, 2015) Ultimately, this could result in policymakers understanding that a potentially cosmopolitan issue may require a cosmopolitan response, and therefore, will pave the way for states to be inclined to utilise the R2P to its fullest extent.

Secondly, a better understanding of the successes that R2P could bring in order to improve communication and thus combat the negative perception of such foreign intervention. As mentioned, the ‘what if’ issue pertains to the fact that one can never be assured that R2P was truly successful. However, this could be mitigated if scholars undertook a more investigative angle to understand the true effect of implementing R2P. This can be potentially researched by comparing case studies of states who have been subjected to mass atrocities. This could be exemplified through judging the difference in collateral damage between the states that received foreign intervention – contrasted with the states that did not. Interestingly, a similar methodology has been used once by scholar Taylor Seybolt to compare the mortality rates to estimate the number of lives that could have been lost if there was no intervention. ‌(Seybolt 2007) However, this study was conducted before the R2P was introduced and was subject to various complexities. Ultimately, if such primary sources of information were made available, it would enable policymakers to have a greater evaluation of the R2P, whilst potentially framing the doctrine in a more positive limelight.

Thirdly, to provide policymakers with a greater understanding of the impacts of the R2P, it would be beneficial to provide a better understanding of the implication’s intervention has on a local front. While scholarship regarding R2P generally focuses on the broader picture, there is a gap in reporting from primary sources of what they believe is of most assistance when facing atrocities. Indeed, ‘on the ground’ reporting offers the capability for scholars to understand the priorities of civilians as well as understanding the challenges they face. Henceforth this could echo the sentiment of protecting civilians’ needs which shall conceptualise the core function of R2P to policymakers. Ultimately, this increased understanding could potentially mitigate the public sentiment that foreign intervention is a form of aggression rather than a sign of hope and therefore alter the decision-making of policymakers.

Bibliography

Averre D & Davies L, (2015) ‘Russia, humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: the case of Syria’, International Affairs, Volume 91, Issue 4, Pages 813–834, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12343

‌Bellamy, A (2012) ‘Stopping Genocide and Mass Atrocities: The Problem of Regime Change’, Pro-tection Gateway, Griffiths University. Doi:http://protectiongateway.com/2012/07/06/stopping-genocide-and-mass-atrocities-the-problem-of-regime-change)

Jacob, C., & Mennecke, M. (Eds.). (2019). ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: A Future Agenda’ (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429293795

Paris, R. (2014). The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the Structural Problems of Preventive Humanitarian Intervention’. Routledge [online] 21(5), doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2014.963322.

Pattison, J. (2015). ‘The ethics of diplomatic criticism: The Responsibility to Protect, Just War Theory and Presumptive Last Resort’. European Journal of International Relations, 21(4), pp.935–957. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066115572491.

‌Seybolt, T B. (2007) ‘Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure’, Oxford: Oxford University Press